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ABSTRACT 
This article addresses the issue of capital taxation relying on three levels of analysis. The first level deals 
with the multiple ways to tax capital (income or value, proportional or progressive taxation, and the 
temporality of the taxation) and presents some of France's particular features within a heterogeneous 
European context. The second area of investigation focuses on the main dynamic properties generated by 
capital taxation: the principle of equivalence with a tax on consumption; the issue of double taxation if it 
targets taxation of nominal income; neutrality of the uniform tax on the capital value; lastly, the risk of 
confiscatory taxation if there is a disjunction between taxation of the value and the income. The final level of 
analysis consists in assessing the debate on the optimal level of capital taxation drawing on the lessons in 
the literature. These discussions are organized into eight themes: (1) double taxation, (2) optimal growth, (3) 
property, (4) tax competition, (5) supervisory arguments, (6) measuring capital gains, (7) complexity and (8) 
fiscal stability. 
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Capital Taxation: Principles, Properties and Optimal
Taxation Issues
1 Introduction
France, like many European countries, experienced a signicant deterioration in its pub-
lic nances due to the nancial and economic crisis which began in 2008. Since 2011, in
response, successive governments have been forced to greatly increase the rate of com-
pulsory levies. The taxation of capital is no exception: it has risen signicantly, with
increased Social Security levies and a greater reliance on the progressive income tax.
The taxation of capital is a sensitive issue, as capital embodies the notion of wealth and
thus of social inequality. At the same time, savings, which fund capital, also symbolizes
e¤ort, that is the willing sacrice of present consumption in order to nance the investment
needed to boost the economys productivity.
Thanks to the taxation, governments are able to secure nancing, assure the proper
functioning of the State and redistribute wealth, while ensuring the maintenance of a
virtuous cycle of sustainable growth. The determination of an optimal tax range is based
on two considerations, specically the nature of the economic variable to be taxed (labour
income, capital income or consumption) and the status of the taxpayer (businesses or
households). In a context marked by the international mobility of production factors and
the great sensitivity of productive capacity (skilled labour and capital) to the level of
after-tax remuneration, public trade-o¤s become especially acute.
Capital taxation may take place at di¤erent "moments" in the life of an investment
lifecycle: upon entering it, during the holding period, or when exiting. It can apply to
capital income, but also to the assets value. Taxation can take be deduced at source,
when the capital held is remunerated (such as with a at-rate withholding tax or corporate
income tax) or be applied as part of a general system of income tax.
The ow of savings is the fraction of disposable income left after consumption. Invest-
ment designates the productive counterpart of this ow. The accumulated savings is the
wealth that is held for a certain period of time. Subsequently, this wealth is liquidated for
the purpose of consumption or else passed on to heirs. The transmission occurs either dur-
ing the investors lifetime (donation) or upon their death (inheritance). The wealth can
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be subdivided into two components: the movable asset, essentially nancial (savings ac-
counts, securities, savings plans, etc.) and real estate assets. For the wealthiest investors
there is also business capital. It is also possible to include "intangible" capital resulting
from a professional activity (inventions and the creation of artistic works) or productive
capacity (human capital). An employee who has contributed to a pay-as-you-go (PAYG)
pension system acquires pension rights(there are no tangible assets in consideration of
the contributions paid), which are not valued from a nancial perspective1.
This article explores the issue of the taxation of capital in three dimensions. First, we
examine what are the di¤erent ways used to tax capital in practice, illustrating these with
the French example, after presenting the very heterogeneous European context. Next, we
study various dynamics generated by this particular tax. Finally, we conduct a review of
the literature in order to consider the issue of optimal taxation.
2 How capital is taxed
The taxation of capital takes di¤erent forms across countries and leads to disparate levels
of taxation. In this section, we present general principles that can be used to characterise
the taxation of capital before studying the diverse situations around Europe and the case
of France in particular.
2.1 General principles
In order to analyse di¤erent ways to tax capital, the tax base this is what is covered
by capital and incomeneeds to be carefully dened. Then, the di¤erent moments when
capital is taxed during the accumulation process are considered. Finally, we look at how
progressive the taxation is.
2.1.1 Taxing the holding of capital or its income: what tax base?
The taxation of capital can apply to both the holding of capital and the income it provides.
1Some countries make a precise estimation of this "asset": Sweden, for example, has adopted notional
accounts that assign a nancial value to the contributions paid (Touzé, 2008); as part of the supplementary
pension schemes in the private sector, French employees accumulate points, which have a conversion value
as an annuity.
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There are three situations in which the holding of an asset can lead to the payment of
taxes:
 registration fees (recognition of property, tax on transactions in securities or real
estate, transfer taxes) are paid in connection with the acquisition of a property or nancial
asset;
 the tax is related to ownership of a property (property tax);
 the tax is paid with respect to wealth (i. e. the French wealth tax, impôt de
solidarité sur la fortune, or ISF).
The tax base directly related to the holding of wealth consists of the properties, rights
and securities held by taxpayers. Thus, land assets, whose value is estimated based on
the cadastral rental value, are used as the base for Frances property tax ("taxe foncière")
on buildings and undeveloped properties.
The taxation of capital also relies on multiple tax bases according to the type of
revenue: rents, dividends, interest or capital gains on sales of securities or real estate.
The income from capital is taxed:
 at source through a tax levied on capital income whenever this is allocated (payment
of interest, prots made by companies);
 as part of the general tax revenues reported, without particular distinction between
income from labour and income from wealth.
Capital is also taxed implicitly:
(1) by increasing taxes on consumption: an increase in Value-Added Tax (VAT) re-
duces the purchasing power of accumulated capital;
(2) ination leads to the depreciation of the purchasing power of nancial capital;
(3) the rate of implicit tax for payroll taxes: the link between pension benets and
the contributions paid sometimes becomes distorted. Indeed, the rules for assigning pen-
sion rights based on the contributions paid do not fully respect actuarial fairness. The
di¤erence can be compared to a subsidy or to implicit taxation (Gannon and Touzé, 2013).
Wealth may also be subject to multiple taxation. In the French case, the total wealth
(property and nancial) is used as the base for the ISF wealth tax.
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2.1.2 When should capital be taxed?
Capital ownership may be taxed at di¤erent moments in the accumulation process (Lav-
igne, 2006): upon the acquisition of the savings product, during the period when it is
held, or upon disposal. Johnson (1994) o¤ers an analysis grid to classify retirement sav-
ings products (products that consist in accumulating a capital with conversion into an
annuity) by criss-crossing two criteria:
1) The taxation (T) or exemption (E) of the product;
2) The date of taxation: upon the acquisition of a savings product, while it is being
held, or upon disposal. The rst letter indicates that the invested funds have already
(T) or not (E) been subject to tax during acquisition; the second whether the products
are taxed or not while being held; and the last whether the asset (capital and income) is
taxed upon disposal.
By crossing these two criteria, we get eight possible tax combinations: TTT, TTE,
ETT, TET, TEE, EET, ETE, EEE. Conventional savings (interest-bearing bank account)
is generally TTE. In the case of life insurance or a Personal Equity Plan (PEA), for
example, we have TEE (the income constituting the savings is not exempt from tax, then
the interest is exempt during the holding period and virtually exempt upon liquidation
with the only tax being social contributions), while in the case of a retirement savings
converted to a lifetime annuity, we have EET (the income saved is deductible from income
tax; the interest paid is not taxed; however, the annuity is taxed).
In France, the existence of the ISF wealth tax complicates this picture because, starting
at a certain level of wealth, savings products that are income tax exempt are not exempt
from the wealth point of view (ISF). Likewise, inheritance tax complicates the picture
because life insurance investments are allowed to escape inheritance tax up to a certain
threshold upon the insureds death (compulsory liquidation), which is not the case for
other assets (real estate, cash, etc.).
Even if a savings product is taxed at several "moments", the idea is not to tax the
same income several times. However, legal provisions do not prevent double taxation on
some products, such as dividends (see 2.3.3 on tax credits).
2.1.3 Choosing the rate: progressivity, proportionality or exemption?
Taxes on income from wealth can be:
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 proportional2 : this is the case when nancial income is subject to a at-rate with-
holding tax as well as social contributions (here Frances CSG and CRDS taxes);
 progressive when all sources of income are summed up and the income tax schedule
is applied (as are also all marriage and family quotients);
 subject to rules on depreciation and deduction (rental investments), with a threshold
for deductibility;
 zero in case of exemption (tax shelter): for example in France, the regulated savings
passbook account (livret A). For investments in life insurance and Personal Equity
Plans (PEA), the exemption is only partial as any type of gains (capital gains and
interest) are subject to social contributions.
Capital tax can also be proportional (property tax), progressive (ISF wealth tax and
inheritance tax) or zero up to a given threshold (exemption). When the tax is progressive,
the average tax rate will depend on the number of heirs for the estate tax, while for the
ISF wealth tax the marriage and family quotients (i.e the tax rebate based on family
characteristics) do not apply, which means that for a given asset the amount of the
wealth tax is the same for a single person or a couple.
2.2 Capital taxation in Europe a very diverse situation
In order to compare the taxation of capital between European countries, we can break
down all compulsory levies into three categories, according to the tax base: labour, capital
or consumption. Europe has highly divergent levels of compulsory levies. France has the
second-highest tax burden (45.2% of GDP in 2012, Table 1), and one of the highest levels
of capital taxation (10.6% of GDP), after Luxembourg3 (10.8% of GDP). Looking at
the share of capital taxation out of the total taxation of factors, France is one of the
countries where capital accounts for an important part of overall taxation (23%), but it
is outstripped by Italy and the United Kingdom (Figure 1).
Over the period from 2000 to 2012 (Figure 2), the average for Europe (EU-27) has
uctuated (no upward or downward real long-term trend ) around a reference level of
2Proportional taxation facilitates a withholding tax.
3The situation of Luxembourg is a little unusual: the high rate of capital taxation can be explained
by the signicant part of the nancial sector in the added value.
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8.4% of European GDP. Over this period, on average, the taxation of capital income
accounted for 4.7% of Europes GDP (Figure 3) versus only 2.7% for the taxation of
capital ownership (Figure 4).
Table 1.Share of di¤erent levies: capital/labour/consumption (2012, % of
GDP)
Source: Eurostat, Taxation trends in the European Union, 2014.
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Figure 1: Compulsory levies on capital (% of total levies; source: Eurostat)
The heterogeneity characterising Europe is persistent: since 2000, no convergence was
observed in the minimum and maximum rates of levies on capital, either at the overall
level (12.1% versus 2.4%), on capital income (8.9% versus 1.7%) or on capital ownership
(4.7% versus 0.5%). In terms of taxation of capital held, France stands out as the country
with the highest level (except in 2008). Since 2000, capital taxation has been higher in
France than the European average. In 2012, the French overall tax burden came very
close to the Luxembourgs, the highest in Europe.
2.3 The case of France in particular
2.3.1 Capital income and capital: some data
According to French national accounts, income from real estate capital (or property in-
come4) accounted for about 172 billion euros in 2013 (Table 2). This gross property
income includes both rent going to landlords and rent5 imputed to homeowners. Finan-
cial income, which includes interest, dividends (net of tax on prots) and other investment
4Property income is calculated from the household account in the national accounts (Antonin, 2009),
and corresponds to the sum of the gross operating surplus (B2) and revenue from land and deposits
(D45).
5Imputed rent "covers the rental service that owners of their residence provide to themselves" (INSEE).
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Figure 2: Taxation of capital in Europe (% of GDP): Total (income and holding)
Figure 3: Taxation of capital in Europe (% of GDP): Income
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Figure 4: Taxation of capital in Europe (% of GDP): Holding
income, amounted to e109 billion. The mixed income of individual entrepreneurs, which
combines returns on capital and labour, topped e122 billion.
Households paid 207.2 billion euros in taxes on income and wealth. The table published
in the appendix details all the taxes levied by the State, how their payment breaks down
between the productive sector and households, as well as the tax bases: capital, labour
or consumption. Among the main taxes on capital, households paid e4.4 billion in ISF
wealth tax, e9.5 billion in estate and transmission taxes, e11.1 billion in Frances CSG-
CRDS taxes and e16.5 billion in property tax (taxe foncière). A share of the e68.6 billion
of income tax is attributable to the taxation of capital income. In addition, Frances
business owners also indirectly paid a tax on their capital income since they have had to
pay e44.3 billion in corporate income tax.
Gross disposable household income came to e1326.3 euros, or about 62.7% of GDP.
Households spent 84.9% of that income on consumption. The remaining 15.1%, i.e. gross
savings, were used for the acquisition (net) of housing (8.9%, or nearly 60% of gross
savings) and for nancial savings (5.8%).
French householdsgross savings represent about 9.5% of GDP, against 3.6% for -
nancial savings.
Householdstotal net worth reached e10,298 billion euros in 2013 (Table 3), or about
9
5 times the GDP. This breaks down into householdsnon-nancial assets (92% of which
is real estate) worth e7,126 billion in 2013 (69.2% of net assets) and net nancial assets
worth e3,172 billion euros (30.8% of net assets).
Table 2.Simplied breakdown of French household income, 2013
(sources: INSEE and authorscalculations)
Table 3. Current wealth of French households, end 2013 (source: INSEE, household
wealth accounts 2013)
2.3.2 Complex tax rules
In France, the tax on capital income has two components (see Table 4):
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- Social insurance contributions (PS), whose rate is set at 15.5%6 ;
- A general tax that is applied either through the progressive income tax (IR, with
ve possible marginal rates: 0, 14, 30, 41 and 45%) or a at-rate levy (prélèvement
libératoire forfaitaireor PLF, a 24% at tax on income from bank savings, but this
possibility is now restricted to households receiving less than e2000 in interest per year;
a tax, ranging from 15% to 35% for life insurance held less than eight years; and a tax
from 19 to 22.5% for PEA personal equity plans held less than ve years).
Some investments benet from exemptions (life insurance, retirement savings, some
real estate investments, PEPsavings accounts, regulated savings, etc.). These exemp-
tions make it possible to avoid income tax if the holding period is long enough (life
insurance, PEA personal equity plan). Others can also be used to escape social contri-
butions (regulated savings). Still others benet from specic tax provisions (company
savings plan, retirement savings plan with conversion to a life annuity, certain real estate
investments, etc.).
Taxation applies on the asset at the time when a property is purchased (conveyance
taxes on a transfer with consideration), during transfer (inheritance or lifetime donations)
or when considered as wealth held.
Taxes on a transfer with consideration (5.09%) are levied on the value of the sale of
the real estate. They are split into several proportional fees collected by the State and
the local authorities concerned (département or commune). Property ownership can also
entail paying specic local taxes: property taxes.
The taxation of transfers (tax on transfers without consideration) is progressive after
reaching a threshold, with marginal rates ranging from 5% for the rst tax bracket up to
60% for lifetime donations or bequests between non-family members.
The wealth tax (ISF) is a progressive tax on capital. Wealth is measured on the
households net assets, excluding exempt goods (business assets, intellectual property
rights, etc.). Over the period 2006-2012, a tax shield was introduced that set a de facto
cap on the ISF: the direct taxes paid by a taxpayer could not exceed a given percentage of
their revenue (60% before 2007, then 50% after the election of President Nicolas Sarkozy).
Initially with six tax brackets going up to 1.80%, the ISF tax was reduced to just two
6The social contributions consist of: 8.20% for the CSG tax, 0.50% for the CRDS tax, 4.50 % for social
security contributions, 2.00% for the Solidarity contribution, and 0.30% for Additional contributions.
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tranches (0.25% and 0.50%) in 2012 after the planned removal of the tax shield on 1
January 2013. Following the election of François Hollande, the scale of the ISF again
assumed a more progressive structure, with ve tax brackets: 0.5%, 0.75%, 1.0%, 1.25%
and 1.50%. As of 1 January 2015, wealth exceeding 1.3 million euros is subject to the ISF
tax.
Table 4.Capital taxation in France
In France, the coexistence of proportionality, progressivity and exemption principles
blurs the transparency of the tax system. Thus, the marginal top tax rates are extremely
disparate, ranging from 0% for capital gains on the main residence to nearly 40% for
capital gains on securities, or from 10% for the taxation of imputed rents (property tax
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for homeowners) to 62% for e¤ective rents (landlords), excluding exemptions. This shows
the States willingness to channel savings towards specic investments, in particular re-
tirement savings, property, social housing (regulated passbook savings accounts livret
A) and the nancing of venture capital. The tax regime on homeowners has become
even lighter as the ctitious income from home ownership has been exempt since 1965,
like gains on the sale of the taxpayers primary residence.
Moreover, savings income has been taxed more heavily over time, leading to greater
equality of tax treatment between income from labour and from capital (Sterdyniak,
2012). The increase in taxation been threesold:
- a gradual increase in social contributions (15.5% today versus 0.5% in 1996);
- the abolition of the income tax credit in 2006 (see below) and a more progressive
income tax schedule, with the taxation of capital gains on securities starting on the rst
euro of sales in 2011,
- quasi-complete elimination of the at-rate withholding tax (PLF), and the integration
of capital gains on securities in the income tax schedule in 2013.
2.3.3 The taxation of dividends after the elimination of the tax credit
Dividends have the particular feature of being taxed twice: in each company, the distrib-
ution of a dividend is a means of using the net income after payment of corporate income
tax. Dividends are taxed as corporate income (IS) before distribution and as income (IR)
after distribution. To eliminate this double taxation, most countries have established
specic tax provisions.
Until 1 January 2005, the tax credit played this role in France, but it was replaced in
2007 by a 40% deduction on the amount of dividends included in the taxable income.
Take the example of a company making a net prot before tax of 100,000 euros in
2013, which is distributed entirely. This is hit by a 34.4% corporate tax (33.3% IS rate
plus the social contribution on prots). The dividend paid (65,600 euros) is rst subject
to a 15.5% social contributions rate, or e10,168, before being subject to income tax (IR).
Part of the CSG tax (5.1%) is deductible from the income tax base. Assume that dividend
holders are subject to a marginal tax rate of 30%; in this case, they must pay income tax
in the amount of:
(e65,600 x 0.6 (deduction of 40 %) e5186 (CSG deduction)) x 0.3 = e10,252.
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In total, the initial prot will be subject to contributions of e34,400 + e10,168 +
e10,252 = e54,820, or an 54.8% overall tax rate, which is higher than the income tax
rate (IR) plus social contributions (30% + 15.5% = 45.5%), which means that double
taxation has only been partially alleviated. A similar calculation shows that if the dividend
recipients are subject to a 40% marginal rate, then the overall tax rate is also higher than
the income tax rate plus the social contributions (58.2% compared with 55.5%).
3 Examples of dynamic properties induced by the
taxation of capital
The taxation of capital or its income has particular intertemporal implications. In this
section, we examine four types of dynamic properties induced by the taxation of capital.
First, the tax on capital income can be compared to a tax rate on consumption that
increases over time. The tax base is in general nominal, which means that the taxation of
real income (i.e. what is economically and scally relevant) may be biased by ination and
lead to double taxation. In addition, by reducing the income from savings, taxes should
reduce the value of the asset, expressing a direct relationship between value and taxation.
However, if taxation is applied equally to all assets and liabilities, a principle of neutrality
is veried. Finally, the excessive taxation of wealth whose value is as dependent on the
discount rate (risk-free interest rate) as on the level of future rent may lead to conscatory
taxation.
3.1 Principle of tax equivalence with a tax on consumption
If we denote the risk-free interest rate by r, the interest factor by R = 1+r and the capital
tax rate income by  r, then 1 euro saved (the marginal sacrice of present consumption)
during T periods leads to the following future gain net of tax (the marginal value of the
future gain):
(1 + (1   r)  r)T = RT  (1   r  r
R
)T (1)
The rate of deformation of the interest factor at horizon T is measured by the term
(1 + (1   r)  r)T . From an intertemporal consideration of consumption, the product of
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the factors in the net return on savings is a coe¢ cient that can be used to discount the
price of the future good. When the capital income is taxed, this discount coe¢ cient
experiences a geometric deformation. If we denote pT as the price of a good consumed in
T periods, the present value of this good is equal to:
pT
RT


1   r  r
R
T
(2)
From the viewpoint of the intertemporal budget constraint (discounted sum of future
expenditures and revenues), a tax equivalence can be identied between taxing the savings
income and taxing the consumption whenever the rate of taxation of consumption at date
T, denoted  p;T changes as follows:
 p;T =
1
(1   r  rR)T
  1 (3)
Taxing the savings income can then be likened to a tax rate on consumption "that
grows exponentially" (Ambler, 1999), which leads to a "rising distortion between intertem-
poral choices" (Piketty and Saez, 2013). Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) see this to be
a problem with a major distortion that is fully ine¢ cient in the long term (see below).
Figure 5 shows an assessment of the implicit tax rate on consumption according to
the investment horizon (horizontal axis) for values of  r = 25% and r = 3%. For horizons
under 12 years, the implicit rate is less than 20% but it is more than 50% beyond 26
years.
3.2 Ination and the average rate of implicit taxation of the real
interest rate
The ination rate measures the monetary erosion of an assets purchasing power. If
the rent provided by the asset is indexed to ination, the value of the asset grows with
ination. When the rent is not indexed (as with bonds whose coupon rate is contractually
xed), ination acts as a tax. Ination is then feared by the asset holder, as is reected
by the notion of "inationary tax".
Since the real interest rate is the e¤ective gain in income obtained from savings and
that taxation is applied to the nominal nancial gain, uctuations in ination lead to
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Figure 5: Implicit rate of taxation of consumption for a saver according to the investment
horizon (with  r = 25% and r = 3%). Source: Authorscalculations.
unstable taxation. Consider an asset without nominal risk remunerated at rate r. We
denote the ination rate by   (r   ) is then the real interest rate. The investor pays a
tax  r  r. After tax, the real income on the wealth equals:
(1   r)  r    (4)
The taxation rate of the real income on the savings, denoted  rm, increases with
respect to the ination rate:
 rm =  r  r
r    =
 r
1  =r (5)
Taxation bears on nominal, not real, income, so the saver also pays tax on the ination
rate, which is tantamount to double taxation. In addition to monetary erosion there is thus
a supplementary tax:  r  . In the conguration where =r > 1, the savers real income
is negative and yet the amount of tax paid remains positive, as the average rate on the
real income becomes negative. The tax on the capital income then becomes conscatory.
We also have  rm > 1, whenever  r > (1   =r). On the other hand, in a deationary
period ( < 0), if the nominal interest rate is zero, the saver is exempt from tax whereas
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Figure 6: Implicit taxation rate of real interest rate between 1981 and 2015 (Hypothesis
: r = 20%). Sources: OECD, INSEE, OECD forecast for 2015, authorscalculations.
the real income of his asset is positive.
If this formula is applied to the French data, with a hypothetical constant levy rate of
20% on income from assets, the e¤ective rate experiences strong uctuations (Figure 6). It
shows a downward trend until the late 1990s because the nominal interest rate decreased
more slowly than ination. Subsequently, from 2000 to 2012, the opposite occurs: the
nominal interest rate fell rapidly. 2012s peak is due to a very low real interest rate was
very low in a context of ination close to 2%. From 2013 on, rate rate declined because
ination fell quickly and the real interest rate once again increased.
This variability in the e¤ective rate is a direct consequence of not properly taking into
account the relevant tax base. It does not obey any economic rationale. This nding
justies the deductibility of ination from nancial income even if the government has to
raise the tax rate in order not to lose tax revenue.
3.3 Value of assets and neutrality of taxation
Whenever assets and liabilities are taxed identically , the marginal losses and gains re-
sulting from nancial trade-o¤s are a¤ected similarly. This is the case when the value
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of loans is deductible from taxable assets and when the loan interest is tax deductible.
For example, one euro borrowed can be used to obtain invested capital (assets) that pays
dividends (potentially taxable earnings) on the one hand and constitutes a debt to be
repaid (liabilities) that leads to payable interest (potentially deductible losses), on the
other hand. In a situation of uniform, proportional taxation, the marginal after-tax gains
and losses arising from nancial decisions are a¤ected equally. This property therefore
leads to the strong neutrality of taxation on the value of wealth.
This neutrality is total in the context of a simple computation of an assets value. The
asset price is valued as the expected discounted sum of a rent or dividend denoted D.
This sum is discounted at a risk-free rate r. Without taxation, the value of the capital,
for a risk-neutral individual, is equal to the present value of the future nancial income.
If the nancial horizon is very long (innite), the income / interest rate ratio measures
the value of the asset:
W =
D
r
(6)
If we introduce a capital tax (W ) in addition to the tax on income, the after-tax cash
ow becomes: D  (1   r)  W W 0, where W 0 is the value of the after-tax capital. We
then obtain a new value of the capital (Bozio et al., 2005):
W 0 =
D  (1   r)  W W 0
(1   r)  r   W (7)
Hence,
W 0 = W (8)
On this theoretical basis, Allais (1966) deduced that the taxation of the capital and
its income has a neutral e¤ect on the value of the capital.
In contrast, the non-taxation of some capital incomes (e.g. implicit rent, that is to
say, the use value of a homeowners residence) induces a distortion once other investments
are taxed. This exemption a¤ects trade-o¤ conditions and changes the equilibrium value
of the untaxed asset. Insofar as the risk-free asset (remunerated at rate r) is taxed, we
thus nd:
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W 0 =
D   w:W 0
(1   r)  r   w
() (9)
W 0 =
D
(1   r)  r
Not taxing the income D thus generates a higher valuation of the assets (W 0 > W ).
The taxation of capital is not neutral anymore.
3.4 Taxation of wealth and conscatory taxation
Taxing the value of capital (the wealth) introduces a relationship between the interest rate
and the average tax rate: if the interest rate (r) decreases, the income does not increase,
yet the tax on the value of the asset rises. The initial value of the capital is then taxed
as well as the unrealized capital gain.
Lets note TK the total amount of the tax on the capital:
TK = W W + R D = W  D
r
+ R D:
The average amount of tax paid on the capital income D is then:
TK
D
= W  W
D
+ R:
D=W measures the average rate of return on the capital. On the nancial market, the
equilibrium veries: W=D = r, hence TK=D = W=r + R.
When the tax rate on wealth is greater than the after-tax interest rate (W > (1  
 r) r), the tax rate on capital income rises above 100%. The tax is then conscatory, and
over time the owner will be gradually deprived of his wealth. There is a disconnection
between the amount of tax on the value of the asset and the benet of the usufruct.
4 In search of an optimal taxation of capital
From an economic point of view, three fundamental principles can be identied for taxing
the wealth produced:
1) The nancing of public goods and services in the sense of Samuelson (1954), which
are characterized by non-rivalry (collective consumption) and non-exclusivity (use is not
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conditional on payment), making it di¢ cult or even impossible to turn to the private
market sector.
2) Social redistribution: the taxes collected become social benets, which can be used
to reduce inequality.
3) Behavioural imperfections, causing a discrepancy between market prices and the
"true" social cost. These could include pollution externalities, requiring a Pigouvian tax,
or the inability of agents to take optimal decisions, which could make it necessary to
distort price signals either through a tax (to discourage) or a subsidy (to encourage).
Then, the tax levied must respect two principles of tax fairness:
1) Horizontal equity: this means the principle of treating "equals as equals". So two
incomes deemed "objectively" identical must be taxed in the same way.
2) Vertical equity: every taxpayer should fund the functioning of the public sector
based on their ability to contribute.
The concept of vertical equity stems from the two grounding principles discussed above:
in general, the utility derived from the use of public goods and services depends positively
on income, whereas social redistribution implies taxing the rich and helping the poor.
The literature on optimal taxation is large (Ramsey, 1927; Mirrlees, 1971; Chamley,
1986; Judd, 1985). There is an utopic rst-rank theoretical optimum, the at-rate tax.
Such a tax is not levied on income but determined only from the full set of intrinsic
individual characteristics. It is very e¢ cient because it creates no distortion in the price
system. But many intrinsic characteristics are in practice unobservable. Optimal taxation
then involves the search for a second-best optimum that leads to a trade-o¤between equity
(maximum social well-being) and e¢ ciency (low distortion of the price system). The
wealth observed after the allocation of an income (labour or capital) or the consumption
of a good, plus the households family situation (single or couple, number of dependent
children) constitute the main frame of the objective tax base.
In this section, we discuss several arguments that may or may not justify the use of
capital taxation. We explore the nature of the debate by drawing on the lessons of the
literature. The debates are organized into eight themes: (1) double taxation, (2) optimal
growth, (3) ownership, (4) tax competition, (5) supervisory arguments, (6) measuring
capital gains, (7) complexity, and (8) scal stability.
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4.1 The debate on double taxation
Since the 19th century (Mill, 1848), a very rich debate has taken place on the legitimacy
of taxing consumption rather than income (Fossatti, 2013). The underlying idea is that
it is fairer to tax the well-being arising from the use of income via consumption rather
than the income earned, and thus indirectly the accumulation of savings, which in reality
is simply potential consumption that has been deferred.
An overall tax on income, applied to the remuneration of labour and savings without
distinction, can be considered double taxation because the income constituting the savings
has already been taxed (Mill, 1848; Fisher, 1939). In 1848, Mill wrote: "Unless... savings
are exempted from income-tax, the contributors are twice taxed on what they save, and
only once on what they spend." However, given that savings generate a real income, it
seems legitimate to consider this as new wealth and thus to tax it. To this end, Fisher
(1906) recommends taxing the "realized" income, which is treated as income actually
consumed (Fossatti, 2013); this is in line with Mills vision (1848) of applying a lower
tax to temporary income (weakly linked with the level of consumption) compared to
permanent income (strongly linked with the level of consumption).
The argument of double taxation is also often put forward when paying inheritance
tax (Arrondel and Masson, 2011), since the savings accumulated by the deceased arose
out of income that was already subject to tax. However, the death of the owner of the
wealth frequently allows the heirs to avoid tax on the e¤ective capital gains unrealized
during the owners lifetime (Sterdyniak, 2015).
4.2 Optimal growth issues
From the perspective of consumer theory, taxing income from savings distorts the rate of
return on capital and generates two contradictory e¤ects:
- A substitution e¤ect (negative on savings) such that the discounted price of future
consumption rises, making current consumption more attractive;
- An income e¤ect (positive on savings), which leads to a lower return on savings and
therefore a reduction in future income, which in turn pushes up the savings needed to
maintain a satisfactory level of future consumption.
From a theoretical perspective, the overall e¤ect is thus indeterminate. However,
whenever a nancial investment is less taxed relative to other investments with the same
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risk structure, the trade-o¤s lead unequivocally to favour holding this type of investment.
The optimal level of capital accumulation has been studied from a theoretical point
of view in the tradition of the neoclassical growth model initiated by the work of Ramsey
(1928), Cass (1965) and Koopmans (1965). This model assumes a planner with an innite
lifetime in the presence of individuals with nite lifetimes (as in Samuelsons model of
overlapping generations, 1958) or innite lifetimes (dynastic model where each parent
integrates the preferences of their descendants into their own preference structure). The
latter proceed to make a double trade-o¤: an instant trade-o¤ between productive e¤ort
(work) and consumption as well as an intertemporal trade-o¤ between current and future
consumption. With respect to individuals with nite lifetimes, postponing consumption
is considered a life cycle choice while accumulating capital to bequeath to descendants is
tantamount to a dynastic choice. The intertemporal trade-o¤ of households leads to the
accumulation of savings, with the counterpart in capital used to produce wealth.
The objective of the benevolent planner is to ensure a trajectory of economic growth
and capital accumulation that guarantees the highest level of intertemporal well-being
while nancing public spending and income redistribution. The potential e¤ect of taxation
on savings incentives raises concerns about the impact on the accumulation of wealth and
consequently on the level of future growth. The intertemporal sensitivity of the tax bases
(capital, labour and consumption) to the tax rate is then a key element in identifying the
optimal levels of taxation.
In a model with an innite lifetime horizon, Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) show
that taxing capital causes a distortion in behaviour that is detrimental to the long-term
optimal level of production. Theoretically, the tax would lead to a level of accumulation
that is not socially optimal, since there would no longer be equality between the "private
cost and the social cost of investment" (Ambler, 1999). The authorsrecommendation is
then to have a zero tax rate on income from savings over the long term. This theoretical
result advocates the exclusive use over the long term of the scal combination: taxing
consumption and taxing labour income. Socially, dispensing with the taxation of capital
income over the long term could lead the public sector to accumulate capital itself, for
a transitional period, thanks to budget surpluses, and thus to tax the capital held by
private agents su¢ ciently. The capital accumulated by the public sector then provides
it with enough additional public resources for the proper functioning of the public sector
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and the social redistribution of resources.
When initially implementing an optimal tax policy, the existing capital is o¤ered
inelastically and taxing capital "does not create any distortion" because the tax "in the
rst period acts as a at-rate tax" (Ambler, 1999). The initial level of taxation is therefore
potentially very high. Straub and Werning (2014) criticized Chamley (1985) and the
literature that followed for constraining the tax rate on capital income to a level below
100%. Such an upper bound de facto prevents the government from practicing conscatory
taxation, which greatly limits the initial tax rate.
However, Straub and Werning caution that "without upper bounds on capital taxation
the solution involves extraordinarily high initial capital taxation, typically complete ex-
propriation, unless the rst best is achieved rst.Saez (2013) also points out this result,
but stresses that Chamleys hypothesis "captures a real constraint faced by tax policy
makers", and that "in practice, wealth levies happened almost never and only in very
extraordinary situations such as wars, or after-war periods". Moreover, this consideration
of the inelasticity of already accumulated capital cannot be repeated by surprise in each
period because every rational saver will anticipate the scal insecurity of savings, which
will undoubtedly pose a problem of time consistency (see below).
Saez (2013) extends Chamleys approach to the case of progressive taxation on capital
income in the framework of heterogeneous individuals with respect to their initial wealth.
Nonlinear taxation does not eliminate the result of the zero long-term taxation of capital
but proves very e¤ective for the sustainable reduction of inequalities in wealth. One
possible interpretation of these results is that it is optimal to tax capital as long as there
are inequalities and the public sector has not accumulated su¢ cient capital to nance
public spending.
This analytical approach is interesting, as it raises the nature of the problem of optimal
taxation in a dynamic context. However, it also has several limitations.
A rst limitation is highlighted by the theoretical analysis of Erosa and Gervais (2002).
These authors considered the problem of optimal taxation in a context of overlapping gen-
erations of representative agents with nite lifetimes. They found that the taxation of
capital income enriches the tax range because it introduces an implicit relationship be-
tween age and income tax. Based on the fact that older workers often have a stronger
preference for leisure, which indicates preference heterogeneity is based on age and accu-
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mulated savings, they conclude that there can be optimal taxation of capital even in the
long term.
A similar result can be obtained also by starting from the heterogeneous preferences
assumption: the best-performing workers are often also the most patient (a lower rate of
preference for the present). Since the level of capital accumulation reveals information
about unobservable individual productivities, taxing capital contributes to tax e¢ ciency.
Another limitation comes from the fact that the sacrice involved in the learning e¤ort
can be important when it comes to accumulating human capital. The intuition is that it
would not be optimal to tax capital and labour di¤erently. Indeed, taxing the income from
labour hits the labour e¤ort and the accumulation of human capital without distinction.
It therefore has an identical adverse long-term e¤ect on the optimal level of accumulation.
In a model of endogenous growth, Jones et al. (1993) conclude that, in the long term,
neither labour nor capital should be taxed. The only tool for public resources would
then be taxing consumption. Moreover, to o¤set the future tax losses resulting from
the disappearance of taxes on labour and capital, the public sector should accumulate
a su¢ cient productive capital upfront. Judd (1999) suggests taxing labour income and
subsidizing, in return, the e¤ort to accumulate human capital, which would make it
possible to treat the two types of productive e¤ort di¤erently for tax purposes. However,
such a tax implies taking into account all the e¤orts of human capital accumulation, which
is certainly unrealistic (with the exception of elements such the overall time and expenses
associated with education) all the more since much of human capital accumulation also
depends on career experience: the "learning by doing" in endogenous growth models such
as Romers (1986).
For some workers and entrepreneurs who are also owners of their company, there is an
additional limit to the Chamley-Judd result. For the tax authority, it is di¢ cult to truly
isolate in the total income the share related to the work e¤ort from the share associated
with capital return. Indeed, entrepreneurs could have an interest in lowering their wages
in order to increase their potentially lesser-taxed prots . Taxing capital income at too
low a rate would then amount to insu¢ ciently taxing labour income. Furthermore, the
productivity of capital can also directly depend on unobservable personal talents, which
can give specic redistributive grounds for taxing capital.
Furthermore, in a context of uncertainty and imperfect nancial markets (uninsurable
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individual risk and credit rationing), the taxation of capital income plays an insurance
role, which may be optimal even in the long term (Aiyagari, 1995; Panousi, 2010). Indeed,
taxing random individual incomes makes it possible to redistribute them and therefore
to mutualize them. With a general equilibrium model with overlapping generations cali-
brated on the US economy and with uninsurable individual shocks, Conesa et al. (2009)
estimate numerically that it is optimal to tax capital more heavily than labour and con-
clude that "taxing capital is, after all, not a bad idea".
Beyond the neoclassical growth model that assumes balanced, e¢ cient markets, there
are other arguments for taxing capital income.
4.3 Taxing property
A strong Marxist argument, also found in Pikettys analysis (2013), tackles the unequal
and dangerous nature of an excessive concentration of capital. In the Marxist analysis,
this led to the dominant position of owners in the labour market. The main risk is then
the alienation of the working class. This results in the exploitation and impoverishment of
the workers. Piketty (2013) observes and denounces a new era of capitalism as manifested
in a higher concentration of income and capital, due to the rate of return on capital being
higher than economic growth.
To ght this excessive concentration, Piketty defends the idea of the progressive taxa-
tion of capital. To be relevant, such a tax would need to be adopted globally. According
to him, the poor situation of the public nances in most developed countries also calls for
the repayment of public debt via a one-time levy on all wealth . The IMFs October 2013
report on taxation also analyses the option of a "one-o¤ capital levy" on net household
assets. In order to reduce public debts to their pre-2007 levels, the IMF estimated that a
10% tax rate on assets would be required. By way of comparison, in France, the o¢ cial
public debt in 2013 (o¤-balance sheet items not included) accounted for about 10% of the
countrys net assets and 20% of households. A general tax of 10% on householdsnet
assets would halve the public debt. This option is also considered by the Bundesbank in
its January 2014 monthly report (Bundesbank, 2014). An additional argument is that
the low ination in the euro zone (and also the prohibition of high ination) eliminates
the prospect of an erosion of nominal debt by a sharp rise in prices.
However, a distinction should be made between capital accumulated at the cost of
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an e¤ort throughout ones working life (life cycle savings) and capital that is inherited.
Concern for the struggle against social inequalities is thus central to the debate on inher-
itance (Piketty and Saez, 2013; Massons "taxnh" proposal, 2015). Even the economists
who are least favourable to the taxation of capital support the idea of taxing inheritances.
In 1939, Fisher wrote: "the best way to avoid a hereditary undemocratic plutocracy ...
would be through taxes on property and inheritance".
Inheritances are not simply nancial legacies. They can also involve the transmission
of human capital through an investment in education by the parents (Bourdieus "social
reproduction" mechanism) or via the transmission of innate qualities (genetic factors). It
is not possible to tax human capital through an income tax. However, taxes can fund
an e¤ective education system to ensure that everyone has an equal access to quality
education.
Allais (1966) also defends the idea of a tax on property but on grounds of e¤ectiveness
and "illegitimate" rent (Bozio et al., 2005; Sterdyniak, 2011; Diemer and Lallement, 2012).
His idea mainly consists in taxing land holdings. The quantity of land is xed by nature
(and thus insensitive to taxation) and independent of the e¤ort in labour or savings, which
would make its ownership illegitimate. However, in order to tax property it is necessary
to dene a tax base. This could mean the value of the wealth but the latter depends
strongly on the discount factor. For Allais, such a tax would be fair and e¢ cient, as it
would lead to freeing up the productive forces (labour, investment, business creation) by
heavily taxing rentiers.
Property, including real estate, also generates a privileged use of local public goods and
services. Taxing households because they are owners would thus be legitimate. Trannoy
(2011) recalled Henry Georges Theorem: "Local public facilities such as roads, schools,
parks, pedestrian areas, cultural facilities, etc., generate additional income for the owners,
who should be taxed to fund the production of public goods." When the productive use
of the tax creates property value, the owner does not lose anything. Trannoy (2011)
also argues that the "market value should be the base" of such a tax. Like the report of
Frances Council on compulsory levies (CPO, 2009), he regretted that the cadastral values
used (rental values) have not been upgraded since 1970. A realistic valuation of real estate
would make it possible to have better taxation, and thus more taxes. This would make it
possible in return to lighten the taxation of labour and productive investment. Artus et
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al. (2013) also recommend upgrading the rental values for taxing real estate more fairly.
Main residence ownership also provides a usufruct related to the fact that the owner
does not have to pay a rent. In France, this implicit rent is not taxed. This is thus
a tax exemption. Sterdyniak (2012) and Artus et al. (2013) recommend taxing this
implicit income. To avoid distortion, such a taxation should be accompanied by the full
deductibility of the interest on loans taken purchase a dwelling.
4.4 Tax competition
In a context of economic and nancial globalization, the issue of tax competition should
not be overlooked. Since production factors are mobile internationally, sovereign states
have an interest in implementing strategies to make themselves scally attractive, by tax-
ing more the least mobile factors more heavily (often labour and also property assets) than
the more mobile ones (often nancial savings and highly skilled work). Tax competition
risks leading to a race towards the lowest compulsory levy, which is synonymous with a
race towards the less protective Welfare system (Le Cacheux, 2008). Another strategy
might be to tax households more and companies less in order to improve competitiveness
(Antonin et al., 2014). Quoting the study by Zucman (2008), Artus et al. (2013) note
that the losses due to tax exiles from the ISF wealth tax would be moderate and would
represent at most 10%. In order to better assess the impact of tax exiles, they recom-
mend publishing the entries and exits of tax residents annually. They also stress that the
mobility of factors facilitates tax avoidance. Once again based on the study by Zucman,
who estimated the hidden side of global wealth at 8%, they consider that the tax loss is
about 10 billion euros in France corresponding to an amount of concealed assets of about
200 billion (compared with 10,000 billion in net assets).
4.5 Supervisory arguments
One supervisory argument concerns the myopia of savers about their long-term consump-
tion needs. This myopia can be related to poor anticipation of the actual importance of
investment and/or income and an "abnormal" preference for the present (poor anticipa-
tion of longer lifetimes). The public argument then is to encourage savings .
The government may rely on public pension systems nanced by contributions that
are made to guarantee income after the period of activity. The government can also set
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up systems of tax exemptions for long-term savings. Insurers (FFSA, 2012) rely on this
argument to defend the tax exemptions on their life insurance products. However, Artus
et al. (2013) moderate this point, arguing that these tax advantages should be limited
to retirement savings (savings converting to a life annuity) because they correspond to a
real intertemporal smoothing of consumption and not to a desire to reduce taxation on
the dynastic bequest, i.e. what one tries to pass on to its o¤spring.
A second supervisory argument concerns the di¤erentiated taxation of savings income:
legislators seek to channel savings towards specic investments, arguing that this would
have a positive impact at the collective level for two reasons: rst, due to shortcomings in
the national productive capital stock, and second, to the need to channel savings towards
long-term investment vehicles, which, though less liquid, are favourable for research and
development and therefore for innovations boosting future growth. The value of promot-
ing long-term investment is put forward by the insurance companies, who claim a key
role in the allocation of savings towards non-speculative long-term investments (Garnier
and Thesmar, 2009; FFSA, 2012). However, wanting to exempt long-term savings from
taxation is paradoxical because these are often better remunerated and less volatile due
to a mean reversion, which results in a reduction in the variance of the average yield over
time (Bec and Gollier, 2007; Hamayon et al, 2013).
There may also be a two-sided approach to the public or private nature of the in-
vestment. Hence the non-taxation of some savings products (regulated savings accounts)
serves to collect large and (usually) stable masses of nancial resources, which are then
lent to the government to make useful investments for long-term economic and social
development.
However, there may be limits to the reduction of taxation on savings and investments.
Overly encouraging the holding of specic investments could trigger nancial bubbles
when these investment products exist in a nite quantity (e.g. land reserves in major
cities). Furthermore, there are also windfall e¤ects: any tax measure benets entirely
the owners of capital goods found in scarce quantities. For example, with regard to the
valuation of property prices, a highly advantageous tax may mostly benet the owners
of scarce land resources and not at all (or very little) buyers who nance their purchase
with a loan.
28
4.6 Capital gains and the holding period
Following the sale of an asset, the saver realizes a gain or loss. From a tax perspective,
a capital gain is considered as income and a capital loss may be deducted from other
present or future capital gains. From an economic point of view, the relevant tax base
must include two dimensions:
 ination (see below): this is a natural rate of depreciation of the assets purchasing
power and must be deducted to measure the actual gain;
 the fair reproduction of the capital gain on a taxable annual basis must consider
the total holding period in the context of progressive taxation.
Upon the death of the asset owner, the unrealized gains during his lifetime are generally
not taxed as such. They are taxed only because they are an element constituting the value
of the asset subject to inheritance taxes. Compared to a saver who has realized capital
gains during his lifetime, there is a breakdown in the principle of tax neutrality.
4.7 Fighting complexity
Besides, the tax code has many special conditions (clauses on tax exemptions, depre-
ciation, deductibility, etc.). These latter tend to complicate the calculation of tax and
therefore its transparency (Council of compulsory levies , 2009) as well as its neutrality,
which can also give rise to undue tax optimizations. The search for e¢ ciency can lead
to simplicity and motivate withholding taxes (Landais, Piketty and Saez, 2011), which
can in turn lead to renouncing a genuinely progressive tax schedule. However, technical
progress in the area of the automatic collection of information on earned income should on
the contrary make it easier for complex taxation systems to deal with an equally complex
reality.
The general recommendation by Artus et al. (2013) points in the direction of simpli-
fying the taxation of capital in order to "reduce heterogeneity" and "limit exemptions".
4.8 Saverscondence, tax stability and time consistency
Finally, taxes on savings su¤er from a major problem of time inconsistency (Ambler,
1999). To encourage households to invest in some savings products, tax exemptions are
announced. Once the investment has been made, the government has every interest in
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not keeping its word and in taxing capital and investment income. Households expect
this inconsistency. So the only time consistent solution is to tax capital heavily or, failing
that, to adopt a strong constitutional commitment that prohibits all retroactive measures.
Several studies (FFSA, 2012; Faider, 2013;Artus et al., 2013) claim that scal stability is
a favourable factor for the condence to invest.
5 Conclusion
Our study of capital taxation followed three levels of analysis.
We rst analysed the multiple ways to tax capital: value versus income, and propor-
tionality versus progressivity. After highlighting the very heterogeneous context in Europe
regarding the taxation of capital, we show how these di¤erent taxation methods apply to
France.
Next, we point out and demonstrate that taxing savings has signicant dynamic e¤ects:
equivalence with a rising tax on consumption; double taxation in the case of taxation of
nominal income; non-neutrality of the tax if some investments are exempt; and potentially
conscatory taxation if applied to the value of the capital.
Finally, we sum up the debate on the optimal level of capital taxation. The main
argument against taxation is that it heavily and unfavourably distorts the optimal accu-
mulation of capital in the long term. Another argument is that opening borders can lead
to lowering taxes on the most mobile factors and therefore on capital. The tax exemption
of some savings products to the detriment of others allows the channelling of savings to-
wards specic types of investments, in order to satisfy growth targets or long-term savings
needs. However, there are many arguments in favour of high taxation, notably based on
the reduction of inequalities and the need to build up su¢ cient public capital and to -
nance local public infrastructure. Taxing capital more e¢ ciently could consist in reducing
complexity to avoid too much tax optimization, and in guaranteeing non-retroactivity to
foster investor condence.
This article does not discuss the unpopular character of the tax or its political sus-
tainability. Any increase in taxes weakens governments politically. However, following
the deterioration in public nances since the crisis, governments have had no choice but
to raise taxes. Today, for reasons of political acceptability, increasing the tax burden
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needs to take place mainly through the elimination of all the tax loopholes where tax
exemptions have become major advantage as other capital taxes have increased.
It seems di¢ cult to reach a clear-clut conclusion about the optimal level of taxation on
capital and notably on the legitimate alignment with labour taxation (Sterdyniak, 2012).
We identify arguments in favour of high capital taxation (sharp increases in inequality
and weak sustainability of public debt). Nevertheless, any such high taxation should be
transitory; raising taxes does indeed have undesirable e¤ects: the risk of the high capital
mobility and the need for legal stability and low tax pressure so as to encourage investment
and the accumulation of productive capital in the long run.
Assessing the real gains of capital requires the completion of a genuine balance sheet
for assets. Such an assessment would accurately measure increases in household wealth
and thus estimate all capital gains, including those that are unrealized or hidden. The
tax base should be real income: ination should be deductible from interest and capital
gains. Given that taxation is progressive, the tax base should also be annualized: the
holding period would be taken into account in the form of a relevant time correction.
Yet in France the level of taxation on capital is already high compared to other Eu-
ropean countries. This discrepancy is disturbing, because it is harmful to attractiveness
and therefore detrimental to long-term growth.
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Appendix
Table - Main taxes by tax base - capital (K), labour (L) or consumption (C) - and payer
sector - households (H) or productive sector (PS)
Source: INSEE and authorscalculations. (*) In billion euros.
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